A Sticky Situation: Clinton’s Conundrum With Gays in the Military

When William Jefferson Clinton was inaugurated President of the United States on January 20, 1993, he was a scrappy young former governor from Arkansas with an ambition that outmatched his political experience. One controversial issue that Clinton addressed with great vigor was the ban on homosexuals in the military. To the surprise of politically minded conservatives as well as many gay democrats, Clinton decided to take a strong stand on the issue and attempted to lift the ban. He soon learned in his first six months in office, that his plans were too bold, as media criticism and plummeting public opinion made him one of the least popular presidents in history during that period. His subsequent moderation on the issue did not earn him any more respect, thus teaching him an important lesson: a good politician does not willingly involve himself in political quagmires. Clinton learned from this early mistake and a symbiosis was formed between him and the media that would give him the political inertia for his ultimate success.

The story begins not with Bill Clinton, but rather with Perry Watkins, the only gay soldier to win in a court battle against the military’s ban on homosexuals, and thus be reinstated (Quade, 26). At the outset of the Vietnam War, the army drafted Watkins in 1967. He told them he was gay, but they accepted him anyways, out of a desperation for soldiers. He was reported to be a good soldier, and was allowed to reenlist three times during the 1970’s. Throughout this period, the army always knew that he was gay. Then in 1981 it all came to an end, after fourteen years of service to his country. When the Reagan Administration took over, the military adopted more stringent enforcement policies regarding their ban on homosexuals. Consequently, he was kicked out—no questions asked or rebuttals allowed (Quade, 26. Often likened to the Rosa Parks of the gay rights movement, Watkins decided to challenge the ruling and sought help from the ACLU. In turn, the case was brought before the United States 9^th Circuit Court, and Watkins won his reinstatement. In 1990 the Supreme Court upheld that ruling.

This is where William Rubenstein enters the story. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Rubenstein was the director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights and AIDS Projects of the ACLU in 1991. He earned his legal wings, when he won the 1989 Braschi v. Stahl decision in front of the New York Court of Appeals (Quade, 26). This was the first time that any state recognized a gay couple as equal to a family. When Rubenstein rose to be the program’s directorship, he continued his push for gay rights across the country. He was disappointed with the Supreme Court’s decision regarding Watkins, because he says that it did not solve any Constitutional issues, only addressing Watkin’s specific case in terms of “fairness.” In the absence of Constitutional answer to the military’s gay ban, Rubenstein and the ACLU continued to put political pressure on politicians to address the problem.

Bill Clinton was willing to accept the challenge. He spoke out against the ban, before he was even elected President. In October 1991 at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Walsh, 33), then candidate Clinton decried the military’s ban on homosexuals (Morganthau, 52). Also, on October 14 of the same year, he attended a reception for several homosexual activists. At this reception he made an outright promise to issue an executive order to overturn the ban (Walsh, 33). The remarks at Harvard were easily dismissed as an attempt to satisfy the liberal base, but the promise at the reception showed his commitment to the cause, not just the politics. Clinton’s ideological connection to the gay rights movement arose from his youth, when he was witness to racial segregation and discrimination. His friends say that he realized the similarities between the gay-rights movement and the civil-rights movement. From the political side, Clinton knew that the gay vote would go dramatically his way and wanted to secure that vote. In fact, an estimated 9 million gays voted for him in 1992 (Walsh, 33). Following his beliefs and political awareness, Clinton persisted towards the cause, even after the Joint Chiefs of Staff threatened to resign en masse that December. Politically, the stance did not seem to make sense. The February 1^st Newsweek article on gays in the military made a most prescient statement, “It is too early to tell whether Clinton’s promise to gays will produce what he and his team must fear most: a high-profile defeat in the early days of his administration.” Then on February 8, 1993, Newsweek’s “Conventional Wisdom” rated Bill Clinton a (-) because of his efforts to lift the ban. It stated glibly, “Voters to prez and media: change the subject” (Conventional Wisdom, 6). It was as if Newsweek and the news media were ready for Clinton to be too bold and then pounce on him. Were the “voters” really asking to change the subject? The same Conventional Wisdom reported that public opinion was nearly evenly divided on the matter. The stakes were high, and the quagmire had been built. So far, the political inertia was against Bill Clinton.

After coming out strong in the first few weeks, Clinton decided to delay action on the promised executive order for six months (Clinton Rekindles…, 772). Foreign policy failures, problems nominating an Attorney General, a failed stimulus package, and his handling of the gays in the military issue are widely credited with making him the least popular President in his first year since polling began in the 1930’s. In June 1993 Clinton’s approval rating was an abysmal 37% (Lacayo, 86). Also pushing Clinton towards the right was the tremendous negative pressure from the Pentagon and from Congress—all of course dutifully reported by the media. Had the media not reported this negative pressure, Clinton would have had little reason to backtrack. Congress was fully in Democratic control and party loyalty would have created the ultimate support of the President’s lift of the ban. However, Clinton is a modern-era President. In the age of 24/7 television coverage, every single criticism of a proposed policy is aired for the entire country to see. If a minority of Congressmen speak out openly against a policy, then it will be reported—over and over and over again. As it was, Clinton backed off, deferring to Secretary of Defense Lee Aspin’s recommendation, which was due on July 15.

Indeed, Secretary Aspin made his recommendation to the President, but his was quite dissimilar to Clinton’s original promise at the October 1991 reception to completely lift the military ban on gays. In consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he developed a compromise proposal. Under the proposal, the military code would retain language that referred to homosexuality as “incompatible” with military service, but homosexuality would be defined narrowly to refer to homosexual conduct only (Chiefs Offer…, 4). Human Events’ reporting on this compromise was quite dubious. It said, “Many believe, however, that the chiefs’ compromise language is something of a cave-in to the homosexual community.” But this statement had two problems. First, the article containing it made no mention of public opinion polls regarding the compromise proposal, to support its use of the phrase, “many believe.” Second, its use of the term “cave-in” implies that this proposal somehow satiates an extreme position. Even with President Clinton and many non-gay Democrats coming out in favor of lifting the ban, Human Events was able to paint any change to the military’s policy as an extreme and unpopular move. If such a false impression is reported repeatedly, does the public start to believe it?

The next month a Newsweek poll on President Clinton’s approval rating came out. His overall job approval rating came in at 44 percent, widely considered a poor rating for a President. While that number was up six percent from a poll done a month beforehand, 56% of respondents specifically disapproved of Clinton’s handling of the gays in the military issue (Orange County Register, a19). These poll numbers would be rereported across the nation, on CNN, the networks, local news, and in newspapers, further solidifying resistance to President Clinton’s support for gay rights.

The quagmire was now complete. Bill Clinton had promised to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military, but now faced a modest majority of Americans opposing him on that stance. With no easy way out, Clinton decided to follow up on the compromise proposal. With the work of Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, and Rep. Ike Skelton (both southern Democrats), Clinton introduced a morphed version of the compromise into Congress, which came to be known as “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” (House Adopts…, 23). The amendment to the Defense Authorization bill passed the House easily. What appeared to be a success on Clinton’s political plate was nevertheless a failure. Some outspoken conservatives opposed the new policy for breaking with the military’s right to determine its own code of conduct and ability to maintain unit cohesion, while many gay rights groups openly criticized Clinton as betraying them, by enacting a proposal that they felt would probably not have any substantive effect. In fact, according to a Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN) report in March 1995, 340 violations to the new “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy had been documented, including 15 “witch hunts” (Landay, 3). The Advocate, a gay and lesbian magazine, took the real effects of the new policy even further in a 1997 article:

This is a time of reminiscence. Four years ago we celebrated the election of a president we believed would open the door to equality for gay men and lesbians serving in the military… Thousands of Clinton’s gay and lesbian supporters thought he would ride into Washington as our savior… The whole fiasco was a sham and a shame. Clinton’s “compromise” policy, “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue,” doomed lesbians and gay men to silence until the law is overturned. (Cammermeyer, 51)

Due to the pressure coming from both sides, Clinton was forced to compromise. On December 2, 1993, President Clinton signed the new policy into law. Secretary of Defense Aspin was given until February 28, 1994 to issue the exact new regulations.

Despite his slip-ups early in his Presidency, Clinton showed his overall political savvy, proving that he could learn from certain political failures, such as his handling of gays in the military. Many attribute Clinton’s resilience to his awesome media skills. Rick Du Brow of the Los Angeles Times writes in a 1996 article, “Bill Clinton, at 47 the nation’s first TV-generation President, has used the home medium more determinedly and relentlessly than [any] of his predecessors in the electronic era” (Du Brow, 2). The article quotes many media and political analysts with such positive adjectives as “outstanding,” “optimist,” “stylistically good,” etc. Clinton’s confidence in the media can be shown by his use of the media. In March of 1994, when his approval ratings were still low, Clinton called a prime time press conference. The Baltimore Sun directly claimed that Clinton probably would not have called the press conference at all, if he did not see his low polling numbers. The article states, “Indeed, it is fair to say that both the politicians and the press have become captives of the polling data” (Germond, 2A). In this world of such consistent and frequent polling data, the press can become a willing tool of a politician to bolster public support—that is, if the politician in question feels confident in his media skills, as Bill Clinton did.

A politician’s relationship with the press is a two-way street. Not only can a politician use the media to advertise his policy ideas and character, but also the media can use its influence to bolster a particular politician or party over another. In newspapers, editorials are the most common method. Particular columnists provide commentary, criticism, and general political analysis on every conceivable topic. Another method is for a paper to make an editorial stand itself, airing a direct stance on an issue or endorsing a particular candidate over another. This method is used less frequently, so as to maintain a non-biased nature to the paper. On the television and radio side, the analog to the columnist would be the political commentator such as Bill O’Reilly or Rush Limbaugh. A third and less obvious method for print or TV media to impart influence lies in the editing process itself. Which stories a paper or TV news show chooses to run, what priority it gives each story, and what context the stories are placed in, can place emphasis on certain issues or people. The National Review along with other sources often characterize the media’s treatment of President Clinton as generally positive. A December 1995 article in the National Review provides a good example of the power of the editing process in imparting a political influence. According to the article, The New York Times ran two pieces on December 4 regarding the mood of the country and feeling regarding President Clinton. One concerning a national issue, the handling of the Bosnian conflict (which had dominated the news for a couple of weeks), was mixed. It was placed on page A10. The other, a story about positive support for Clinton in Michigan, was placed on the front page, even though it only dealt with issues from only one state (Clinton redux, 16).

An honest look at Clinton’s presidency cannot point to any one factor that led to his ultimate success and popularity. Clinton’s political savvy, and the important lessons of his early presidency certainly played a role. The public trend to support a divided government, and hence support Clinton against the Republican Congress played a role. The press, with its intrinsic nature, certainly played a substantial role, especially with Clinton’s prodding. Irregardless of the exact cause(s), however, Clinton’s approval ratings began to rise late in his first term. By December of 1995, a CBS News-New York Times poll showed his approval rating at 51%. Even more importantly, in the same poll, Clinton led Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole 52% to 38% when respondents were asked whom they would vote for if the election were held immediately (Approval Rating, 51). The inertia was his and the rest is history. Clinton went on to win in a landslide against Dole in the 1996 Presidential election, and become one of the most popular Presidents of the time in his second term. He would show his honed political skill by fending off several scandals, including the Monica Lewinsky scandal that brought impeachment hearings against him.

The symbiosis between President William Jefferson Clinton and the American news media provides a great example of the media’s role in contemporary American politics. A successful politician’s main goal is to remain popular and hence use that popularity to build support for policy initiatives. When Clinton embarked on his crusade for gay rights with a seemingly modest goal of ending the military’s ban on gays, he belatedly realized the negative pressure he would receive, from Congress and the Public. The media emphasized this pressure, thus placing Clinton into a political quagmire. Clinton’s subsequent political maneuvers showed that he learned his lesson and became the cornerstone of one of the greatest political comebacks of all time. And the role of the media? “As George C. Edwards explains, journalists ‘frame the news in themes’ as a way to simplify complex events and then reinforce these themes through repetition. Thus images or stereotypes are built up that people perceive as reality” (Mann, 59). Clinton understood this well. Grab the political inertia and don’t look back.

Sources Cited:

Quade, Vicki. “Gays in the Military: Finally Being All That You Can Be.” Human Rights. Spring 91, v18, i1, p26

“Conventional Wisdom.” Newsweek. 1993. v121, i6, p6

“Clinton Rekindles Debate Over Gays in the Military.” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 1993. v51, i13, p772

“House Adopts Compromise on Gays in the Military.” Human Events. 1993. v53, i42, p23

“Nation Briefly.” Orange County Register. August 1, 1993. a19

Lacayo, Richard. “Nothing But Blue Skies.” Time. 1994. v143, n5, p86

Germond, Jack and Witcover, Jules. “Politicians, press become captives of opinion polls.” The Baltimore Sun. March 26, 1994.

Walsh, Kenneth T. “Why Clinton Fights for Gays.” U.S. News and World Report. 1993. v114, n5, p33

“Clinton Redux.” National Review. 1995. v47, n24, p16

Landay, Jonathan S. “New Policy on Gays in Military Draws Fire One Year Later.” Christian Science Monitor. 1995. v87, i77, p3

Morganthau, James. “Gays and the Military.” Newsweek. 1993. v121, i5, p52

Du Brow, Rick. “TV the Great Communicator for a Skillfull…” The Las Angeles Times. March 26, 1994

Cammermeyer, Margarethe. “A Sham and a Shame.” The Advocate. February 4, 1997. p51

“Approval Rating Poll Has Clinton Up, Gingrich Down.” The Las Angeles Times. December 15, 1995. p51

Mann, Thomas E. and Ornstein, Norman J. Congress, the Press, and the Public. Washington, DC. AEI and the Brookings Institute: 1994. P. 59.