Lucas D. Sayre

Theo. 281: War, Law, and Ethics

Professor Margaret Pfeil

essay #2

10.03.03

 

 

The Gravest Decision: the Dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima

 

            History surely reports the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima as one of the gravest decision of all time. Today we are faced with evaluating President Truman’s decision on moral grounds. While we cannot possibly put ourselves in his place and understand the emotions and thoughts that must have plagued him, we must nevertheless evaluate the decision with the fullest of our faculties and with the utmost sincerity. With such an evaluation, I conclude that the bombing of Hiroshima was a necessary evil, and morally tenable.

            This moral analysis will hinge on a framework of two aspects: necessity and proportionality. While contained in Christian jus in bello just-war tradition, the application of these two aspects is without traditional precedent. Therefore, any evaluation of the propriety of the Hiroshima bombing must apply these aspects anew. Ultimately, if convincing, the body of arguments this particular analysis follows will contribute to that Christian just-war tradition.

            Necessity. “A. Unnecessary combat is to be avoided even in a just cause. B. During combat, no unnecessary death or destruction may be inflicted” (Yoder, 156). Two questions are at stake here, in regards to the bombing of Hiroshima. First: was the massive bombing of a civilian center necessary to bring about the American objective of unconditional surrender? Yes it was, because the military and social texture of the Japanese culture would have resisted conventional military means to the extent that a greater moral evil (see section on ‘proportionality’) would have occurred in the attempt to force unconditional surrender. The Japanese military establishment opposed such surrender under any terms and even attempted a coup against Emperor Hirohito when he decided to announce a surrender over the radio. Furthermore, one must note that two bombs fell on Japanese population centers before the Emperor even decided to surrender. This fact debunks Douglas Lackey’s argument that “the ‘shock’ effect of a new weapon is retained in a demonstration” (Lackey, 41). If dropping an atomic bomb on a city is not sufficiently shocking, then dropping it over deserted land certainly will not be. Historians often say that the Japanese people would have followed their Emperor to the death, because of the cultural elevation of the Emperor to divine status. Therefore, no Japanese unconditional surrender would have occurred without convincing the Emperor and without the dropping of the two atomic bombs on population centers.

Second: was unconditional surrender a necessary and morally acceptable demand? Walzer says ‘no’ on page 267 of his book, “The Japanese case is sufficiently different from the German case that unconditional surrender should never have been asked.” But is it really? Walzer argues that unconditional surrender was necessary against the Germans because allowing Nazism to live after the war’s end would have permitted an evil so great that it threatens the world’s fabric of justice. Such is also the case with Japanese imperialist rule. The Japanese government used violent coercion over its own people and other peoples in much the same manner as the Nazis. In Nanking, Japanese troops were instructed to execute one-by-one at least two hundred thousand innocent Chinese civilians. From 1931-1945, conservative estimates show that Japan was responsible for the deaths of as many as 17,222,500 people, mostly in Asia (Landesman, 34). Permitting this imperialist regime to remain in power, where they could breed such evil in the future, would have been morally unacceptable.

Proportionality. “A. The damage must not be greater than the damage prevented or the offense being avenged” (Yoder, 156). The bombing of Hiroshima killed between 200,000 and 300,000 people, mostly innocent civilians. This act, standing alone, is evil. No follower of Christ can deny this. However, the damage prevented by the bombing of Hiroshima was far greater. Numerous sources place the predicted number of American troop deaths at or above 200,000, and the deaths of Japanese soldiers and civilians in a conventional invasion of the Japanese mainland at or over 1 million.

In this light, Truman was faced with two evils and the unenviable task of calculating between them. He chose the path that saved the most people: soldiers and civilians alike. While grave, this decision was ultimately morally tenable, the choice of the lesser of the two evils. In the continuance of the debate over Hiroshima’s morality, we must so endeavor in order to provide our posterity with the best guide in the event they find themselves faced with such a grave decision.